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Deterrent Punishment and Respect for Persons
Zachary Hoskins*
This article defends deterrence as an aim of punishment.
Specifically, I contend that a system ofpunishment aimed at deterrence
(with constraints to prohibit punishing the innocent or excessively
punishing the guilty) is consistent with the liberal principle of respect for
offenders as autonomous moral persons. I consider three versions of the
objection that deterrent punishment fails to respect offenders. The first
version, raised by Jeffrie Murphy and others, charges that deterrent
punishment uses offenders as mere means to securing the social good of
crime reduction. The second and third are developed by R.A. Duff The
second holds that deterrent punishment inappropriately excludes
offenders from the moral community. The third charges that deterrent
punishment offers community members the wrong sorts of reasons to
comply with the law. I conclude that each of these objections fails. A
system of punishment aimed at deterrence (suitably constrained) is
consistent with respect for offenders as moral persons.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deterrence-based accounts of punishment have been criticized frequently
because they are unable to rule out occasionally punishing innocent citizens, or
disproportionately punishing guilty ones, if doing so would yield net deterrent
benefits.' In response to these sorts of objections, some theorists have argued that
although considerations of deterrence cannot ground a complete justification of
punishment, they may nevertheless shoulder some of the justificatory burden.
Perhaps most notably, H.L.A. Hart contended that consequentialist considerations
such as crime prevention represent the central aim of punishment, but that
particular impositions of punishment should be constrained by the familiar
principles that only the criminally guilty should be punished, and only in
* Ph.D., 2011, Washington University in St. Louis. I am grateful to Richard Dagger, Larry
May, Christopher Heath Wellman, and David Wood for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this paper.
1 See, e.g., DAVID BOONIN, THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT 41-52 (2008); JOHN BRAITHWAITE
& PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 46 (1990);
DEIRDRE GOLASH, THE CASE AGAINST PUNISHMENT: RETRIBUTION, CRIME PREVENTION, AND THE LAW
43-44 (2005); W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 56-57 (1930); H.J. McCloskey, An
Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism, 66 PHIL. REv. 466, 468-69 (1957); H.J. McCloskey,
Utilitarian and Retributive Punishment, 64 J. PHiL. 91, 93-102 (1967).
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proportion with the seriousness of their crimes.2 Constrained by principles such as
these, deterrence as an aim of punishment looks significantly more appealing.
Even with these constraints, however, deterrence as an aim of punishment has
been subject to a further line of criticism. Here, the objection is not that in some
cases considerations of deterrence might permit the punishment of law abiders, but
rather that punishment aimed at deterrence fails to respect offenders as
autonomous moral agents-or in Kantian terms, as ends in themselves.' This
challenge is particularly powerful. It does not merely charge that deterrent
punishment might allow, in certain cases, the disrespectful treatment of offenders;
if this were the charge, then perhaps constraints could be articulated, similar to the
constraints against punishing the innocent, to rule out such treatment. The
objection here, however, is that punishment aimed at deterrence by its nature fails
to treat offenders with respect.4 If the charge is valid, then additional constraints
will not help.
This paper defends deterrence as an aim (in my view, the central aim) of
punishment against this objection that deterrent punishment fails to respect
offenders as moral persons. I examine three prominent ways in which this charge
has been fleshed out. First, some theorists, such as Jeffrie Murphy, have objected
that punishing with the aim of deterrence uses the offender as a mere means to
secure some social benefit, namely, crime reduction.6 The second and third
versions of the objection have been developed thoroughly by R.A. Duff. A system
of criminal law and punishment aimed at deterrence, Duff claims, offers reasons
for compliance that are inappropriate to autonomous moral agents, and it implicitly
excludes criminals from membership in the political community.7 Duff offers
these as aspects of the same line of critique,8 but I argue below that they are in fact
separate charges and thus merit distinct consideration. I contend that none of these
objections ultimately succeeds. That is, none of them establishes that punishment
aimed at deterring crime fails to demonstrate appropriate respect for persons.
Specifically, a deterrent system of punishment-bounded by appropriate
constraints on who may be punished and how severely-does not treat offenders as
mere means to securing certain social goods, it does not offer inappropriate reasons
2 H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 8-13 (2d ed. 2008). See also Don E. Scheid,
Constructing a Theory of Punishment, Desert, and the Distribution of Punishments, 10 CANADIAN
J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 441, 449-50 (1997) (imposing punishments "only on offenders for their
offenses and only in appropriate amounts"). For a somewhat different sort of disaggregation of the
relevant questions, see Ross, supra note 1, at 61-64.
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217, 218-19 (1973).
4id.
Id. at 219.
6 See id.
7 R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 13-14 (2001).
8 See id. at 13.
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for compliance with the law, and it does not implicitly exclude criminals from
membership in the political community.
In Part II, I examine and refute the objection that deterrent punishment uses
offenders as mere means to securing the social goal of crime reduction. In Part HI,
I take a closer look at Duff s account and contend that he actually offers two
distinguishable versions of the respect-based objection. In Parts IV and V, I
examine each of these objections in turn, and I conclude that neither succeeds.
Ultimately, deterrence is a permissible aim for a system of criminal punishment;
that is, punishment aimed at deterring crime can be consistent with respect for
moral persons.
II. DOES DETERRENCE USE OFFENDERS AS MERE MEANS?
One way to interpret the charge that deterrent punishment fails to respect
offenders as persons is that such punishment appears to use offenders as mere
means to deterring crime. Jeffrie Murphy, for instance, has written of deterrence
that "a guilty man is, on this theory, being punished because of the instrumental
value the action of punishment will have in the future. He is being used as a means
to some future good--e.g., the deterrence of others."9 Such punishment thus
appears inconsistent with maintaining proper respect for offenders as autonomous
moral agents.
Murphy's characterization of the good being sought as "the deterrence of
others" points to a sense in which we might think one form of deterrence can be
especially problematic.10 That is, it might seem bad enough that punishment
subjects offenders to hard treatment with the aim of promoting the social good of
crime reduction. A critic might further point out, however, that one type of
deterrence, general deterrence, seeks to achieve this social good by treating
offenders in certain ways in order to affect others' behaviors, to persuade others to
comply with the law. Special deterrence may also seem troubling insofar as it
subjects an offender to hard treatment to bring about the social good of crime
reduction, but at least it treats the offender in this manner with the aim of affecting
her own future behavior, of persuading her to comply with the law in the future,
rather than treating her in this way to affect others' behavior. Thus, insofar as this
objection is valid, it strikes particularly hard at general deterrence.
We might respond to this line of critique by pointing out that political
communities also harm law abiders for the sake of promoting some greater good.
Construction of a new highway may be beneficial to the community generally, but
it may harm those who live nearby (perhaps by generating noise pollution or
diminishing property values). Similarly, those with a communicable disease may
be forced to endure certain restrictions of their liberties in the interest of protecting
9 Murphy, supra note 3, at 219. See also BOONIN, supra note 1, at 60-61; DUFF, supra note
7, at 13-14.
10 Murphy, supra note 3, at 219.
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public health. If harming some for the greater benefit of others is permissible in
cases such as these and numerous others, then perhaps harming offenders to
benefit the public by deterring crime is similarly permissible.
David Boonin rejects this line of response, however, because he believes it
overlooks the distinction between intending harm and foreseeing harm." Boonin
points out that cases such as those described above-the highway construction, or
quarantining those with a communicable disease-"do not involve intentionally
harming some people in order to benefit others. Rather, they involve intentionally
doing acts that foreseeably cause some harm to some people and provide greater
benefits to many others."l 2 He continues:
[T]he fact is that punishment stands alone as the one instance in which
the state not only does an act that predictably harms some of its citizens,
but in which it acts with the explicit aim of causing harm. Punishment is
utterly anomalous in this respect. This is precisely what makes
punishment distinctively difficult to justify in the first place. 3
Thus, for Boonin, a deterrent system of punishment is objectionable because it
intentionally harms some to benefit others. The harm is the means by which the
good is achieved, not merely a foreseeable consequence.
Given that the ultimate aim of a system of deterrent punishment is to reduce
crime, however, I suggest that actual inflictions of punishment are not the means
by which the system seeks to achieve this aim. Rather, the threat of punishment is
intended to do the deterrent work.14  A deterrent system of punishment
communicates a threat to everyone in the community: if you do these acts, you will
be subject to punishment. Consider that if the threat of deterrent punishment were
perfectly effective, no one would violate the community's laws, and thus, no one
would be punished. Actual instances of punishment, then, are best seen as cases
where the deterrent threat failed.'5  The inflictions of harm that constitute
punishment are not the means by which the good of crime reduction is achieved;
rather, the means by which deterrent systems of punishment aim to reduce crime is
by issuance of a threat. Obviously, in the real world, deterrent systems of
punishment are not perfectly effective. Individuals continue to commit crimes
" BooNiN, supra note 1, at 61-62.
12 Id. at 62.
13 Id. See also Nathan Hanna, Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism, 27 LAW &
PHIL. 123, 124-28 (2008) (discussing hard treatment and suffering as part of the definition and
essential characteristics of punishment).
14 One might worry that the threat of punishment is itself a sort of coercive sanction, in that its
aim is to change incentives so that, in effect, it restricts citizens' viable options. I consider this point
more below.
1s S.I. Benn noted this point. S.I. Benn, An Approach to the Problems of Punishment, 33
PuL. 325, 330 (1958).
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despite the existence of the deterrent threat. In these cases, such individuals are
harmed in the ways characteristic of punishment. But such individuals are
foreseeably rather than intentionally harmed. Again, this is because the intention
of a deterrent system of punishment is that everyone should take the threat
seriously and avoid criminal behavior (and, in turn, punishment).
Boonin insists, however, that the intended-harm element is essential to our
conception not only of deterrent punishment, but of punishment in general . I He
writes:
When the state punishes someone, . . . it inflicts various harmful
treatments on him in order to harm him. It is not merely that in
sentencing a prisoner to hard labor, for example, we foresee that he will
suffer. Rather, a prisoner who is sentenced to hard labor is sentenced to
hard labor so that he will suffer, and if a given form of labor turned out
to be too pleasant and enjoyable, he would be sentenced to some other
form of labor for precisely that reason.
Boonin may be correct with respect to punishment whose central aim is
retribution, or perhaps even special deterrence (although even on these accounts
there would presumably be plausible considerations cautioning against lengthening
or altering sentences once they had been issued). His point is mistaken, however,
with respect to general deterrence. In a system of punishment aimed at general
deterrence, sentences are not imposed to inflict suffering on the offender, but rather
to maintain a credible threat to the public generally. Typically, of course, the more
severe the sentence, the more the offender will suffer and the more credible the
threat will be. But the concern, from the perspective of general deterrence, is not
how much an offender suffers, but rather how effectively the general public is
deterred from committing the given offense. In fact, if the credible threat could be
maintained without harming any offenders, then this would be entirely acceptable
based solely on considerations of general deterrence.'s Punishment aimed at
16 BooNIN, supra note 1, at 12.
" Id. at 13.
18 This point, in fact, grounds a distinct objection commonly leveled against deterrent
punishments generally: insofar as the deterrent threat is what is crucial, the legal authority might be
justified in some cases of merely pretending to punish offenders. This prospect is particularly
troubling to those with the retributivist intuition that the guilty deserve to suffer. Advocates of
deterrence as an aim of punishment might respond to this objection in various ways: they might
contend that the public's likely discovery of the pretend punishment cases could undermine the
general deterrent effect of the threat, or that whereas general deterrence constitutes one aim of
punishment, there are others (retribution, reform, etc.) that rule out the possibility of pretending to
punish. Whether these or other responses would be persuasive need not worry us here, because the
question of whether general deterrence would permit pretend-punishing is a distinct one from the
question of whether punishments aimed at general deterrence treat offenders as mere means. For
present purposes, the relevance of the pretend-punishing objection is that it underscores that
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general deterrence, then, is best characterized not as intentionally harming some to
benefit others, but rather as intentionally threatening everyone, and then
foreseeably harming those who nevertheless commit crimes.
Suppose, however, that I am wrong about this. Suppose that punishment
aimed at deterrence is in fact best understood as intentionally harming some to
benefit others. This is still not enough to establish that such punishment would
violate the Kantian principle of respect for persons. It is widely recognized that
this principle does not forbid treating others as means, but as mere means. We
frequently treat others as means to our own or other people's ends, and we
typically consider such treatment permissible. I ask a taxi driver to take me to my
destination, our country sends soldiers to fight in a war to protect our interests, or I
ask a friend to lend me money. The taxi driver, the soldiers, and my friend are all
treated as means to others' ends (mine, or in the case of the soldiers, the country's),
but we do not find these cases objectionable as long as they are not treated merely
as means. The relevant question for this version of the respect-based objection,
then, is whether deterrent punishment treats offenders merely as means to the
social good of crime reduction.
There are good reasons to doubt that punishing for deterrence uses offenders
merely as means to the end of crime reduction. First, note that insofar as the
institution of punishment yields a deterrent effect, those who commit crimes
typically will have reaped benefits from the existence of this institution just as law
abiders have done. Perpetrators of crime are also, like other community members,
potential victims of crime. Thus, insofar as the institution of punishment helps to
deter crime, it protects the safety and security of everyone.
One might respond that an offender may still be treated merely as a means
when she is harmed in the interest of securing this social good, even if the social
good is also a good for the offender herself. If our legal system sanctioned the
occasional punishment of innocent people for the purpose of achieving the
beneficial deterrent effect, for instance, then these individuals would be used as
mere means even if they themselves had benefited from the deterrent effects of the
institution generally. Thus, even if both offenders and law abiders enjoy the
general benefits of deterrent punishment, this fact by itself appears insufficient to
assure that such punishment avoids using offenders as mere means.
Deterrent punishment with prohibitions on punishing the guilty is relevantly
different, however, from a system of deterrent punishment (even an overall
beneficial one) that allows the punishment of the innocent. To punish law abiders
would be to treat them in ways that were not responsive to choices they had
actually made, and thus it would fail to respect them as autonomous moral agents.
Respectful treatment requires, at least, that we treat others according to what they
have actually done (or failed to do); punishing those who have violated no criminal
laws fails to meet this minimal standard of respect. Notice, though, that a deterrent
punishment-as-general-deterrence aims to reduce crime not by harming offenders but rather by
issuing a threat.
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system of punishment does not only offer to each community member the benefits
that come from reduced crime. Deterrent punishment constrained by the
retributivist principle against punishing the innocent also allows each individual to
choose whether she will risk suffering the harms associated with punishment.
Such a system offers everyone a choice: comply with the law, or be subject to
punishment. Thus, unlike the innocent person who is punished to achieve the
deterrent effect, the offender's punishment is a response to the choice she made to
violate the law. Given that her punishment is a response to her own free choice,
the fact that the aim of punishing her is to deter others from committing similar
crimes (or her from committing similar crimes in the future) does not imply that
she is treated merely as a means to this end. Hart expresses this essential idea, as
he describes the institution of punishment as "offering individuals including the
criminal the protection of the laws on terms which are fair, because they not only
consist of a framework of reciprocal rights and duties, but because within this
framework each individual is given a fair opportunity to choose" between
complying with the law or facing punishment. 9
Still, even if an institution of deterrent punishment offers benefits to everyone,
and even if it offers each community member equally a choice about whether to
endure the threatened sanction, one might still object that this choice itself is
coercive, that it employs the threat of harm to restrict citizens' viable options.
Richard Burgh objects to Hart's account by offering what he considers an
analogous case, in which terrorists take a group of people hostage and tell each that
"if he attempts to escape, he will be beaten." 20 The terrorists treat all of the
hostages equally, and they stay true to their pledge to beat only those hostages who
try to escape.21 "Simply because a hostage is given a fair opportunity to avoid
being beaten," Burgh concludes, "it does not follow that his beating is just."22
Even if the terrorists "were to inform the hostages that if they do as they are told
they will receive positive benefits," beating those who tried to escape would be
unjust.23  Burgh concludes that, analogously, deterrent punishment cannot be
justified on grounds that it provides a choice either to comply with the law and
reap benefits from others' compliance or to break the law and suffer punishment.24
Contrary to Burgh's charge, however, there is a fairly straightforward
difference between the choice offered by the institution of deterrent punishment
and the choice offered by the terrorists. Given that the terrorists violate each
hostage's liberty rights, the hostages' choice is either not to do that which they
have a moral right to do (namely, leave) or to be beaten. So the terrorists use the
1 HART, supra note 2, at 22-23.
20 Richard W. Burgh, Do the Guilty Deserve Punishment?, 79 J. PHILOSOPHY 193, 199 (1982).
21 id
SId.
23 Id. at 200.
24 id
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prospect of force to persuade the hostages not to do what they have a right to do.
A system of deterrent punishment, however, employs the prospect of force to
persuade community members not to do the sort of acts that they have a moral
obligation not to do.25 Thus, the relevant question is whether a system of
punishment that provides significant benefits to community members generally,
and that offers a choice either not to commit acts that one has moral obligations
not to commit or to be harmed, is coercive in a way that renders it inconsistent
with respect for moral persons. Given that such a system offers each community
member benefits, treats each according to her own choices, and seeks to persuade
citizens not to do that which they have a moral obligation not to do anyway, I
suggest that such a system is consistent with respecting individuals, even those
punished, as autonomous moral agents.
Kant himself provides support for the view that punishment, properly
constrained by the retributivist principle, may aim at deterrence while nevertheless
respecting the offender.26 A criminal, he writes, "must previously have been found
punishable before any thought can be given to drawing from his punishment
something of use for himself or his fellow citizens."27 Although Kant's full view
of punishment continues to be the subject of substantial debate,28 in this passage he
suggests that deterrence is a permissible aim, which for him means that it does not
use the individual as a mere means, as long as punishments are limited to those
who are guilty of crimes.29
I conclude that punishment aimed at deterrence does not use offenders as
mere means, and thus this version of the respect-based objection fails. Still, Kant's
respect principle instructs us not only not to use others as mere means, but also to
respect them as ends in themselves. 30 Respecting people as ends may require more
than merely not using them as mere means. Perhaps, then, there is a sense in
which punishment aimed at deterrence nevertheless violates the respect principle.
In the following three parts, I consider what I take to be the most thorough and
compelling development of this sort of objection, by R.A. Duff.
25 This is the case, at least, when the laws backed by deterrent punishment are justified. By
contrast, unjust laws (e.g., laws allowing, or requiring, what is morally prohibited) backed by
deterrent punishment would be analogous to Burgh's terrorist example. As such, a system of
deterrent punishment backing such laws would fail to respect those punished as moral persons.
26 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1797), reprinted in IMMANUEL KANT:
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 353, § 6:331, at 473 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996).
27 id
28 See, e.g., Thom Brooks, Kant's Theory of Punishment, 15 UTILITAS 206, 208-15 (2003);
Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment, 18 LAw & PHIL. 407, 408-09
(1999); David Sussman, Shame and Punishment in Kant's Doctrine of Right, 58 PHIL. Q. 299, 302-
09 (2008).
29 See KANT, supra note 26, at 473.
30 See id.
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I. DUFF'S CRITIQUE OF DETERRENCE
R.A. Duff conceives of the criminal law as fundamentally a communicative
enterprise. 3' He argues that a system of punishment that aims to deter potential
offenders is inappropriate for a liberal political community committed to
respecting its members as members of the community. Essentially, this is
because deterrent punishment communicates in prudential rather than moral terms:
The law of [a liberal political] community, as its common law, must
address its members in terms of the values it embodies-values to which
they should, as members of the community, already be committed. It
portrays criminal conduct as wrongful in terms of those values; and the
reasons that citizens have to refrain from such conduct, the reasons to
which the law refers and on which it depends, are precisely the moral
reasons that make such conduct wrong. A purely deterrent law, however,
addresses those whom it seeks to deter, not in terms of the communal
values that it aims to protect, but simply in the brute language of self-
interest. It thus addresses them, not as members of the normative
community of citizens, but as threatening outsiders against whom the
community must protect itself. It implicitly excludes them from
membership of the citizen community by no longer addressing them in
terms of that community's values.
Duff is concerned, commendably, that offenders should be treated as moral
persons, and in fact as continuing members of the community, rather than merely
as the "['they'] against whom 'we,' the law-abiding, must protect ourselves." 34
His concern is well founded; it is all too easy, and too common, to assume that the
criminal act necessarily demonstrates a criminal, perhaps even irredeemably
criminal, character. Duff urges us, however, always to regard the person guilty of
a criminal offense as nevertheless one of us, a member of our community who may
come to share (or recommit to) the moral values that the community endorses.35
Despite the significant virtues of Duff's account, however, I contend that his
objection to punishments aimed at deterrence misses its mark. There is a real
sense in which a system of punishment aimed at deterring crime (with appropriate
constraints) can nevertheless demonstrate appropriate respect for criminal
offenders, and thus avoid being objectionably exclusionary.
Note that Duff actually offers two critiques of systems of punishment aimed
at deterrence-two ways in which such systems of punishment fail to treat
3t DUFF, supra note 7, at 79.
3 Id. at 78.
3 Id. at 78-79.
'4 Idat 78.
35 id
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individuals with appropriate respect as autonomous moral agents. First, deterrent
punishment offers individuals the wrong sort of reasons to comply with the law. It
offers merely prudential reasons to comply-i.e., to avoid incarceration,
community service, etc.-rather than the appropriate moral reasons-i.e., that the
prohibited acts are morally condemned by the community. Second, by offering
merely prudential reasons, rather than making the sort of moral appeal that is
appropriate to members of a liberal political community, a deterrent system of
punishment implicitly excludes those it addresses from membership in the
community. It fails to respect them as fellow community members who, as
members, share (or should share, and can come to share) the community's moral
values. Punishing to deter is thus exclusionary, Duff believes, in that it reinforces
the distinction between "us," the law-abiding citizens, and "them," the criminals,
rather than treating offenders as continuing to be fellow members of our
community.
Duff implies that the second critique follows from the first. That is, he
indicates that a system of punishment aimed at deterrence excludes certain
individuals from the political community because it offers them the wrong sort of
reasons (i.e., prudential reasons) to comply with the law.36 In fact, however, these
are distinct critiques. The charge that deterrent punishment is exclusionary rests
on the notion that it treats offenders differently from law abiders. It perpetuates
the distinction between "us" (the law abiders) and "them" (the criminals) and
implicitly excludes "them" from the community in which "we," as law abiders, are
still included as members. By contrast, the objection that punishment aimed at
deterrence provides the wrong sort of reasons to comply with the law does not
depend on its offering diferent reasons to offenders and to law abiders. Rather, a
system of punishment might offer the same inappropriate reasons for compliance
to everyone. As such, it would not treat one group (offenders) as less a part of the
political community than another group (law abiders). It would not perpetuate the
objectionable "we" and "they" distinction, because such a system would
communicate the same message, and offer the same reasons, to everyone. Thus,
whereas one objection contends that deterrent punishment offers the wrong sort of
reasons, the other contends that such punishment inappropriately offers different
reasons to different members of the community.
I suggest, then, that these two critiques warrant distinct consideration. We
should ask, first, if punishment aimed at deterrence communicates a different
message to (or provides different reasons to, or in some other way excludes)
36 Id. at 78-79.
3 One might respond that such a system of punishment would then be exclusionary of
everyone. But if everyone is excluded, then we must ask, excluded from what? Duffs point is that
deterrent punishments exclude offenders from their communities, but if all community members (law
abider and offender alike) were excluded, then it is not clear what community would remain for those
excluded to be excludedfrom. Thus, central to the charge that deterrent punishment excludes certain
community members is the claim that it treats some (the excluded) differently from others (the
included).
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criminals from the political community generally; and second, if the reasons such a
system of punishment offers for.complying with the law are themselves the wrong
sort of reasons to offer fellow members of the political community. I consider
each of these critiques in turn and contend that, ultimately, each fails. A system of
punishment aimed at deterrence communicates the same message to everyone in
the political community. Thus it does not implicitly exclude anyone. Furthermore,
a deterrent system of punishment is compatible with demonstrating appropriate
respect to all members of the community as members who share (or should share,
and can come to share) the community's fundamental moral values.
IV. Is DETERRENT PUNISHMENT EXCLUSIONARY?
The first objection evident in Duff's account is that a system of punishment
aimed solely at deterrence implicitly excludes offenders from their community. It
treats offenders as the "they" against whom "we," the law-abiding members of the
community, must protect ourselves. Thus it fails to treat offenders with
appropriate respect. Given Duff's conception of the criminal law as a
fundamentally communicative enterprise,38 the worry with deterrent punishment is
that, insofar as it offers the offender only prudential reasons why she should not
have committed, say, theft or tax evasion, it fails to communicate with her as (still)
a member of the community. A more appropriate message to a community
member would appeal to the moral reasons that her act was wrong, namely, that
such acts violate important moral values that the community shares (and thus that
she, as a member of the community, should also share).
The thrust of the "exclusion" objection to deterrent punishment, then, is that
once a member of the community commits a crime, the criminal law stops talking
to her as it talks to law abiders, to whom it offers appropriate, moral reasons not to
violate the law. Instead, it begins to talk with her in the language of mere
prudence, as though this is the only language she is capable of understanding. As
such, it inappropriately excludes her from membership in her community.
One might understandably be tempted to respond here that the offender, in
committing her crime, essentially excludes herself from membership in the
community-or at least, that she demonstrates that she does not share the
community's moral values. If so, then it may seem appropriate for a system of
punishment to communicate to her solely in the language of prudence rather than
in the language of the community's moral values. Duff rejects this argument,
however, for several reasons, the most persuasive of which is that it is empirically
dubious. 39 Often, criminal acts are not evidence that offenders have no regard for
the community's moral values, but rather
38 DuFF, supra note 7, at 79.
39Id. at 84.
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[T]hat their regard is not wholehearted, or consistent, or always sufficient
to overcome the temptations of self-interest. They-or rather we, since
these comments surely apply to many of us-are not wholly deaf to the
law's moral appeal, though we do not attend to it consistently or
carefully enough.40
Duff is right to caution against assuming that an individual's criminal act is
evidence of a complete rejection, or lack of regard, for the community's values.
There is a more fundamental problem, however, with the claim that deterrent
punishment somehow communicates to offenders differently from law abiders, and
thus excludes offenders from the political community. The message
communicated by a system of punishment aimed at deterrence essentially takes the
form of a threat: if you commit some criminal act, then you will be liable to having
some form of suffering inflicted on you. It is important to consider, however, to
whom this message is communicated. For deterrent punishment to be
exclusionary, to create the sort of "we-they" dichotomy that concerns Duff, it
would have to be the case that a system of deterrent punishment communicates one
(prudential) message only to criminal offenders, and that law abiders, by contrast,
receive another (moral) appeal that is appropriate to members of the political
community.
But this is doubly wrong. First, a system of deterrent punishment
communicates its prudential message, its threat, to everyone. For those who have
not committed a crime, the prospect of punishment offers reasons not to do so (i.e.,
it acts as a general deterrent). For those who do commit crimes, their
punishments-or more specifically, the unpleasant prospect of another term of
punishment in the future-provide reasons not to recidivate (i.e., they act as a
special deterrent). From the perspective of deterrent punishment, then, everyone is
a potential offender (or reoffender), and such a system of punishment
communicates the same prudential message to everyone. Therefore, and secondly,
if law abiders receive the moral appeal that Duff believes is appropriate to
members of the political community, the source of this appeal is not the system of
deterrent punishment. Rather, the moral appeal must come from somewhere else,
such as, perhaps, the criminal laws themselves. But if it is the criminal laws that
communicate the moral message, that declare certain actions to be morally
condemned by the community, the intended audience of this communication is
everyone, law abider and offender alike. Thus, it is not the case that, in receiving
the prudential message of a deterrent system of punishment, offenders are treated
differently from others in the community, who are exclusive recipients of the
moral message. It appears that deterrent punishment is not essentially exclusionary
in the way Duff indicates.
There are other ways, of course, in which existing penal practices tend to
exclude offenders from the community. Imprisonment, by its nature, removes
4 Id.
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offenders physically from the larger community. Beyond this, prisoners are
typically excluded from participation in the political process, most obviously by
being denied the vote. 4 1  Also, offenders are excluded from access to basic
financial services (bank accounts, credit, insurance), not only during their
incarceration but often, in practice, even after their release.42 These and other
forms of exclusion should be troubling to members of a liberal political
community who are concerned to treat individuals, even offenders, with respect as
autonomous moral agents. But notice that such forms of exclusion are not
distinctively characteristic of systems of punishment aimed at deterrence (and
constrained in the ways suggested earlier). Because punishment involves the
restriction of offenders' liberties in ways that law abiders' liberties are not
restricted, issues of exclusion will always arise. But such issues are not distinctive
of systems of punishment aimed at deterrence. Rather than communicating
differently to offenders and law abiders, and thus perpetuating the "we-they"
distinction that concerns Duff, systems of punishment aimed at deterrence regard
everyone equally as potential offenders. They communicate the same message,
namely, if you commit a crime, then you will be liable to being harmed. I
conclude, then, that punishment aimed at deterrence is not exclusionary as Duff
charges.
V. DOES DETERRENT PUNISHMENT OFFER THE WRONG SORT OF REASONS FOR
COMPLIANCE?
Given that deterrent punishment communicates the same reasons to everyone,
the question then becomes whether these reasons are appropriate. Duff contends
that they are not. He writes, "The criminal law of a liberal polity, and the criminal
process of trial and conviction to which offenders are subjected, are
communicative enterprises that address the citizens, as rational moral agents, in the
normative language of the community's values." 43 Additionally, the institution of
punishment, a constitutive element of the institution of criminal law generally,
must similarly communicate in moral rather than prudential terms. A system of
punishment aimed at deterring criminals, however, aims to secure general
compliance with the law by means of a threat, rather than by moral appeal. Thus,
Hegel famously objected: "To base a justification of punishment on threat is to
41 In the United States, only Maine and Vermont allow incarcerated felons to vote. The
Sentencing Project Interactive Map, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
http://www.sentencingproject.org/map/map.cfin (last visited Nov. 19, 2010). A number of states go
further than this, imposing a lifetime voting ban on anyone with a felony conviction, even those who
have served their sentences. See id.
42 Gaynor Pengelly, Give Prisoners Bank Accounts, THis Is MONEY (Oct. 25, 2010),
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/savings-and-banking/article.html?in-articleid=517136&inpage-id
=7&position=moretopstories. For a fuller discussion of types of exclusion, see DUFF, supra note 7, at
75-77.
43 DuFF, supra note 7, at 80.
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liken it to the act of a man who lifts his stick to a dog. It is to treat a man like a
dog instead of with the freedom and respect due to him as a man."4 Like Hegel,
Duff worries that the prudential terms in which deterrent punishment
communicates with community members, the prudential reasons it gives them to
comply with the community's laws, are not the sort of reasons that are appropriate
to offer to autonomous members of a liberal political community, who endorse (or
could come to endorse) the community's moral values.4 5
I offer a couple of responses to this worry. First, punishment may
communicate a prudential message to community members without
communicating a solely prudential message. In my view, the good of punishment,
the reason we should want such an institution, is that it plays a key role in ensuring
the well-being of community members. Thus, the proper aim of punishment is to
prevent or reduce crime by offering potential wrongdoers reasons not to offend.
Punishment may serve this aim by supplying potential offenders with prudential
reasons not to offend (reasons such as the desire to avoid the harms characteristic
of incarceration, etc.), but it may also provide moral reasons. As is commonly
recognized, punishment involves not only what Joel Feinberg called a "hard
treatment" aspect but also an expressive aspect in that punishment expresses the
community's condemnation of the offender for her criminal act.46 Even before the
comiission of a crime, however, the threat of punishment also expresses the
community's condemnation not of a particular offender but rather of the offense
itself. If a potential offender receives and accepts this message of condemnation, it
may play a role in persuading her not to do what she otherwise would have done.
If so, then even if the fear of punitive suffering also played a role in dissuading her,
I suggest that she is treated with the respect due to her as a moral person. Thus,
even if a system of punishment's central aim is to provide prudential reasons for
compliance, this does not preclude its also providing moral reasons.
Second, even if a system of punishment did provide solely prudential reasons
to comply with the law, this does not show that the criminal legal system more
generally fails to communicate with community members as moral persons. I
agree with Duff that the criminal law should appeal to citizens as moral agents who
share (or should share, and can come to share) the community's values. But
punishment is only one aspect of the criminal legal system. Suppose we grant,
then, that a community through its criminal statutes declares certain acts to be
wrong and makes a moral appeal to community members to comply, whereas trials
and convictions communicate a message of deserved moral censure to the
wrongdoer and urge the wrongdoer "to understand and accept the censure as
justified." 7 Why, then, must punishment also make a moral appeal? Why is it
4 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 246 (T.M. Knox trans.,
1942).
45 DUFF, supra note 7, at 80.
4 JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function ofPunishment, 49 MONIST 397, 397-423 (1965).
47 DUFF, supra note 7, at 80.
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inappropriate for the institution of punishment to communicate a solely prudential
message?
First, one might argue that the criminal legal system must be univocal in the
message it communicates to community members, and that this message must be a
moral rather than a prudential one. Thus, the institution of punishment, as one
element of the criminal law generally, must communicate a moral message. It is
not clear why this should be so, however. We can grant, with Duff, that the
criminal legal institution should communicate a moral message to community
members while still: (a) recognizing that distinct elements of the institution can
communicate different messages; (b) maintaining that the criminal statutes
themselves, and perhaps the process of trial and conviction, sufficiently
communicate the moral message; and thus, (c) denying that punishment must
communicate this same message. Notice, too, that if the entire criminal legal
system must be univocal in its moral message, much more than deterrent
punishment would be prohibited. The practice of plea bargaining, for one, would
appear unjustifiable if prudential appeals were inappropriate in criminal law. More
reasonable, I suggest, is to claim that the criminal law should address community
members in moral terms, and in fact that the moral message should be central, but
that as long as this moral message is present, prudential appeals also have an
appropriate role.
A second possible response is that whereas the criminal law need not, in
principle, communicate only a moral message, the prudential message of deterrent
punishment is inappropriate in practice because it tends to drown out the moral
message. That is, perhaps the threat of punishment is so powerful that it tends to
focus community members' attention on the prudential reasons not to commit
crimes and causes them to lose sight of the moral appeal. Andrew von Hirsch,
who conceives of punishment as offering prudential reasons to supplement the
(sometimes insufficiently motivating) moral reasons supplied by the criminal law,
advocates a "decremental strategy" according to which prescribed sentences would
be reduced gradually to levels at which the prudential reasons they offered would
not drown out the moral reasons for compliance with the laws. 48 Duff is skeptical
of such a strategy, however, as he believes that sentences mild enough so as not to
overwhelm the moral message with the prudential threat would be too mild to
achieve much deterrent effect at all.4 9 By contrast, sentences sufficiently severe to
provide any genuine deterrent effect would replace, rather than merely supplement,
the moral appeal.o
I suggest that this worry, that the prudential appeal of deterrent punishment
may drown out the moral message of the criminal law generally, inaccurately
depicts the relationship of the moral and prudential appeals. Rather than accepting
that a stronger prudential message will tend to weaken the moral message
48 ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 36-46 (1993).
49 DUFF, supra note 7, at 88.
50 Id
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comparatively, why not acknowledge that the prudential threat actually can
reinforce the moral appeal? Granted, an institution of punishment aimed at
deterrence provides prudential reasons to comply with the community's laws. But
the existence of such an institution also invites us to consider, or remind ourselves,
why our community believes that these laws, and the interests they protect, are of
sufficient moral weight that we are willing to invoke the threat of hard treatment to
help ensure that they are not violated. Rather than drowning out the moral
message of the criminal law, as Duff fears-the message that certain acts are
prohibited because society regards them as significant moral violations-deterrent
punishment can reinforce this message, as it underscores that protecting
community members from such violations is sufficiently important to warrant the
infliction of harm as a response.
The prudential message of deterrent punishment, therefore, is compatible with
the criminal law's communication of a moral appeal to community members, and
thus with respecting them as autonomous moral agents. On one hand, a system of
punishment aimed at deterrence may nevertheless provide moral as well as
prudential reasons for compliance. On the other hand, even if punishment itself
provides only prudential reasons, the criminal legal system need not be univocal.
As long as the moral message is communicated prominently (by the laws
themselves and the process of trial and conviction), respect for persons does not
require that the institution of punishment communicate in moral terms. I conclude,
then, that this third articulation of the respect-based objection fails.
VI. CONCLUSION
In closing, it is worth emphasizing again the scope of the defense of
deterrence that I have offered here. Specifically, I have not aimed to defend
deterrence as sufficient to ground a complete justification of punishment. Rather,
my focus has been on deterrence as the aim of punishment, constrained by certain
considerations such as the retributivist principles against punishing the innocent or
excessively punishing the guilty. Critics of deterrence, such as Murphy and Duff,
claim that even as one element of this sort of hybrid account of punishment,
deterrence is objectionable because it fails to treat individuals with appropriate
respect as autonomous moral agents. I have contended, however, that on what I
take to be the three most plausible articulations of this critique, it nonetheless fails.
Constrained in certain ways, then, I conclude that deterrence is a permissible aim
of punishment.
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